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ABSTRACT
What do you give for free to your competitor when you ex-
hibit a product line? This paper addresses this question
through several cases in which the discovery of trade secrets
of a product line is possible and can lead to severe conse-
quences. That is, we show that an outsider can understand
the variability realization and gain either confidential busi-
ness information or even some economical direct advantage.
For instance, an attacker can identify hidden constraints and
bypass the product line to get access to features or copy-
righted data. This paper warns against possible naive mod-
eling, implementation, and testing of variability leading to
the existence of product lines that jeopardize their trade se-
crets. Our vision is that defensive methods and techniques
should be developed to protect specifically variability – or
at least further complicate the task of reverse engineering it.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
D.2.0 [Software Engineering]: Protection mechanisms;
D.2.7 [Software Engineering]: Distribution, Mainte-
nance, and Enhancement—Reverse engineering and reengi-
neering
Keywords
Product lines, reverse engineering, ofuscation, security
1. INTRODUCTION
The engineering of a product line makes it possible to
offer numerous configuration options (or features) and de-
liver unique products (or variants) to customers. Substan-
tial profit is expected in terms of customer satisfaction, mass
customization, market presence, etc. But what do you give
for free to your competitor when you exhibit a product line?
Hopefully nothing: the technical, software realization and
the underlying business information of a product line should
generally remain hidden to avoid losing some economical
edge. In reality, it may happen that product lines jeop-
ardize their trade secrets. For instance, an attacker or a
competitor can identify hidden constraints and bypass the
product line to get access to features or copyrighted data.
As a first concrete example, let us consider an online news-
paper. (We use a real-world example, see Section 2.1 for
further details.) This newspaper freely delivers online news
and articles to readers. In addition to this free content, there
is a protected access for paying subscribers that allow them
to read brand new content a few hours before it is made
public. However, a naive implementation in the website of
the newspaper allows a regular reader to access protected
articles without paying. The code impacted is given after:
1 if ( navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase ().indexOf(’
google ’) === -1 &&
2 navigator.userAgent.toLowerCase ().indexOf(’
msnbot ’) === -1 &&
3 document.referrer.toLowerCase ().indexOf(’google ’
) === -1 &&
4 document.referrer.toLowerCase ().indexOf(’bing.
com’) === -1)
5 { document.getElementById(’articleBody ’).innerHTML =
document.getElementById(’articleBodyRestraint ’).
innerHTML; }
A user can change the user agent of her browser and
avoid ”articleBody” to be replaced by the content of ”ar-
ticleBodyRestraint”. Thereby, the user get access to the full
content of the article for free. The major error is to dele-
gate the checking to the client side, at the JavaScript level.
The original intention was to offer a variant of the page to
Web search engines in order to reference additional content.
However the means to realize the variants (for regular read-
ers, for members, for different Web search engines) is highly
questionable. It is too easy for an outsider to understand the
product line and override functionalities of a certain variant.
This example shows that a trade secret leaked by this
naive implementation can have consequences: here the fact
to give access for free to a non-member (hence losing some
money); one can also envision that a scrapper could au-
tomatically extract all protected content. In fact, various
other consequences are possible: a competitor could fully
re-engineer a product line and then propose an improved
one; technical or marketing constraints could be identified,
analysed, and exploited to identify some weaknesses of the
business of a product line; digital content under copyright
and only accessible through a combination of (hidden) op-
tions might be extracted comprehensively, etc.
The first objective of this paper is to warn against possi-
ble naive modeling, implementation, and testing of variabil-
ity leading to the existence of product lines1 that jeopardize
1We are considering ”product lines” in a broad sense, i.e.,
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their trade secrets. There are two kinds of trade secrets.
First, the way a product line is realized: if discovered, the
technical advantages are lost, a third-party can further re-
exploit domain artefacts, etc. Second, the confidential in-
formation of a product line: it may be copyrighted content,
a marketing practice, etc. The two secrets are related: the
understanding or reverse engineering of the technical real-
ization is usually necessary to collect sensible information.
We present case studies in which the discovery and under-
standing of variability is possible and can lead to severe (eco-
nomical) consequences. Section 2.1 further details the case
of online newspapers, showing other variability-based bugs.
Section 2.2 describes an online generator of video variants in
which protection of copyrighted data matters. Section 2.3
points out the protection issues faced by Web configurators.
As a result, it is not enough to model, implement, and
test a product line. Our vision (hence the second major
point of the paper) is that defensive methods and tech-
niques should be developed to specifically protect variability
and configurations. We call to further investigate the pro-
tection perspective onto software variability, a topic quite
absent in the software engineering and product line liter-
ature. Numerous techniques for software protection (e.g.,
code obfuscation [4]) have been considered, but the specifici-
ties of variability and configurations raise novel challenges.
A malicious attacker should have difficulties to build mental
abstractions, to identify and reason about variability, and
to navigate into the configuration space. Otherwise the re-
verse engineering and the re-engineering of the product line
is highly facilitated and can even be automated. Section 3
summarizes our findings, discusses potential techniques for
protecting variability, and outlines a research roadmap.
2. PRODUCT LINES CAN JEOPARDIZE
TRADE SECRETS
2.1 Online Newspapers (Cont’)
The first example in the introduction is based on a real
wrong design decision2 that has been fixed afterwards. We
now describe another problem in the same domain. For
confidential reasons, we call it fakenewspaper hereafter. The
website is separated in two domains (1) fakenewspaper.com
gives a limited access to public articles; (2) subscriber.
fakenewspaper.com gives a complete access to paying cus-
tomers. In complement to providing early access to new
articles, the variant of fakenewspaper for subscribers pro-
vides additional services (e.g., easy-reading option, limited
amount of advertising). As in the previous example, the
verification is done on the client side. When a visitor ac-
cesses subscribers.fakenewspaper.com, a JavaScript checks
whether she is a member. In case the user is not a member,
the page is redirected to fakenewspaper.com.
Why protecting variability? By deactivating
JavaScript, a regular (non paying) reader can access articles
that should be restricted to subscriber.fakenewspaper.
com. An outsider can even implement a script that auto-
mates the task of finding the complete text in subscriber.
software systems coming in different variants (like the news-
papers), generators (like the video generator of Section 2.2),
or configurable systems (like configurators, see Section 2.3).
2http://linuxfr.org/users/jarvis/journaux/
lemonde-fr-ou-l-abonnement-au-javascript
fakenewspaper.com and injecting it in the normal page of
fakenewspaper.com:
1 if(document.getElementById("articleBody") != null){
2 var urlMod = window.location.href.replace("www.
fakenewspaperpl.com","subscribers.
fakenewspaperpl.com");
3 GM_xmlhttpRequest ({
4 method: "GET",
5 url: urlMod ,
6 onload: function(response) {
7 var responseHtml = new DOMParser ().parseFromString
(response.responseText , "text/html");
8 document.getElementById("articleBody").innerHTML =
responseHtml.getElementById("articleBody").
innerHTML
9 }
10 });}
Similar scripts can be implemented so that regular read-
ers can use the variant of fakenewspaper and benefit
from the subscribers’ options (e.g., limited advertising) of
subscriber.fakenewspaper.com for free.
We can wonder why fakenewspaper uses such a naive ap-
proach for protecting its variant and options. Several hy-
pothesis can be formulated. The first one is that this ap-
proach is easy to implement for developers while the eco-
nomical risk might be considered as limited. That is, there
is a tradeoff between development effort and protection of
trade secrets. The second hypothesis is that there is ac-
tually a third variant for Web search engines. There is a
clear need to reference content in this domain – it is cru-
cial for the business of newspapers to be properly referenced
in search engines. This implementation strategy has the
merit of allowing search engines to easily crawl the articles.
Again a tradeoff has certainly been discussed and found. In
any case, the current solution is clearly suboptimal. More
sophisticated strategies can certainly be considered not to
jeopardize trade secrets.
2.2 Video Generator
We report on an experience related to an online video gen-
erator. Compared to [3], we add here further details under
the angle of software protection. The service offers to gen-
erate variants of an humorous video. Internet users simply
have to type their name, select 3 options, and a particular
video is launched and visualised in the browser. The service
is quite popular and successful: more than 1.7M of video
variants have been generated in 1 week. We put ourselves as
attackers. We audited and studied the generator as a black
box system without access to the source code of the server
side. We started reverse engineering the service through the
analysis of the communications between the server and the
client. Though the JavaScript was obfuscated, the observa-
tions of HTTP requests and the use of a JavaScript debug-
ger reveal the overall behaviour. We quickly noticed that
all video variants are constituted of 18 sequences of videos
that are themselves separated in several sub-parts. That is,
a video variant is modularized.
The partitioning of the video in 18 sequences forms a first
level of modularity (see À in Figure 1). For each sequence
of a video, numerous alternatives are possible. This corre-
sponds to a second level of modularity which focus on the
variability of the video sequences (see Á in Figure 1). A
video variant results of the selection of an alternative for
each sequence. The generator automatically selects an al-
ternative, either based on the 3 selected options or through
probabilistic choices for the other 15 sequences. Finally, a
third level of modularity is realized by the partitioning of
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Figure 1: Video generator: modularity and variants
each alternative (see Â in Figure 1). Overall modularity al-
lows the server to share small video files and thus to improve
the scalability/reactivity the service.
The communication between the client and the server to
generate and play a video variant is as following. First, the
client asks for the generation of a new video. The server
returns a list of file names corresponding to the selected
sequences (e.g., {S1a2, ..., S18a4}). Each file corresponds
to a playlist that defines the sub-parts of the sequence e.g.,
in Ã of Figure 1 the playlist defines 3 sub-videos: S9a10,
S9a11 and S9a12. The client downloads all the playlists and
their corresponding videos. Finally, the client merges the
videos of the playlists and plays the resulting video variant.
Why protecting variability? The implementation of
the product line can cause two important threats. The first
threat is that an attacker can download the video sequences,
which are protected by copyright. As digital content is a key
business value, protecting the access to data becomes a se-
curity problem. Without defensive mechanisms, an attacker
can extract and generate all the possible video variants of
the original service. The second consequence is that a new
configurator can be re-engineered and could ”kill the origi-
nal idea” [3]. Specifically we showed it is straightforward to
re-engineer a new generator and configurator in which users
configure in a fine-grained way the 18 variations points –
instead of only 3 in the original version. That is, with a re-
engineered solution, the surprise effect is limited when get-
ting a new video variant. Instead, users can control, choose
and visualize any alternative (video sequence). The creators
of the generator did not have this intention – they did not
want to jeopardize their trade secrets.
An important lesson learned is that the modularity of data
(video variants) poses a problem from a protection perspec-
tive. From a software engineering and product line perspec-
tive, modularity is undeniably good and remains a standing
goal of any project. However modularity can backfire: an at-
tacker can too easily understand the generation process and
the differences between alternative sequences. With modu-
larity, the task of determining the number of sequences and
identifying the alternatives corresponding to each sequence
does not face any obstacles. Similarly the collection and the
composition of video sequences is immediately understood.
Another important lesson learned is that an attacker
should have difficulties to navigate into the configuration
space. Otherwise she will be able to understand the whole
product line and extract trade secrets in a comprehensive
and automatic manner. Protection mechanisms for block-
ing frequent requests are worth considering but may not be
sufficient.
2.3 Web Configurators
A Web configurator provides an interactive graphical user
interface that guides the users through the configuration pro-
cess, verifies constraints between options, propagates user
decisions, and handles conflictual decisions [1]. Configura-
tors are used in installation wizards, preference managers,
and extensively used in product lines. The database main-
tained by Cyledge is a striking evidence with 900+ Web
configurators coming from 30+ different industry sectors [6].
A very simple excerpt of a real-world Web configurator is
depicted in the Figure below. We can observe that the selec-
tion of Diesel has lead to the automated selection of EDC6.
(In fact, some other equipment options have been previously
selected; one can select Diesel with EDC7 or BVM in some
other configuration settings.) That is, a customer has not
chosen EDC6; the configurator has imposed some constraints
of different natures: technical/engineering constraints, aes-
thetic constraints, marketing constraints, etc.
Why protecting variability? Products, options, and
the underlying constraints a configurator is in charge of are
key information of an organization. Such information is par-
ticularly interesting from the perspective of (online) market
intelligence (MI) (also called competitive intelligence). MI
can be defined as the ”information relevant to a company’s
markets, gathered and analyzed specifically for the purpose
of accurate and confident decision-making in determining
market opportunity, market penetration strategy, and mar-
ket development metrics.” Lixto, a company offering data
extraction tools and services for MI, showed that it is tech-
nically feasible to acquire and exploit unstructured and semi-
structured data in several case studies (e.g., in the domain
of computers and electronics consumer goods [2]).
Most information on product pricing, availability, options
and constraints is potentially available on Web sales config-
urators. Specifically, competitors can use this information
(1) for getting a comprehensive overview of the options and
constraints in the market; (2) to be (continually) informed
about strengths and weaknesses of other competitors’ prod-
uct lines; (3) to publicly reveal a certain superiority or mar-
keting practice, etc.
Web data extraction systems [2, 5] can be specialized for
acquiring configurators’ information. Early attempts shows
that reverse engineering Web configurators is feasible [1].
Static analysis techniques can locate templates of options
and some constraints in a Web page. Combined with crawl-
ing techniques for deep navigation and dynamic content
pages, there is the potential to fully gather relevant informa-
tion. In case the static and dynamic analysis of variability
can be seamlessly realized, there is a risk for companies de-
veloping Web configurators to reveal trade secrets.
3. PROTECT VARIABILITY!
We observe that the case studies are sharing similar classes
of security and protection issues. We identify three kinds of
vulnerabilities (related to positive variability, negative vari-
ability, or configuration space) and leading to the possible
leaks of trade secrets. We draw a research roadmap high-
lighting four directions (RD1, RD2, RD3, RD4).
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Protection of positive variability (RD1). Voelter
et al. describe variability implemented with compositional
approaches as positive variability since variable elements are
added together [7]. It is the case of the video generator
case study (see Section 2.2) in which video sequences are
assembled to build a video variant. It may also be the case
in Web configurators (see Section 2.3) in which options are
added on-the-fly depending on some user choices.
We have shown in Section 2.2 that an attacker can too eas-
ily reverse engineer the product line with a clean modular-
ization design. The vulnerabilities are coming from the iden-
tification of the modules and their direct mapping in terms
of features in the variability model. From this identification,
an attacker can infer how these modules can be composed
together to re-engineer the product line (i.e., by positive
variability). It should be noted that the positive variability
(and the underlying issues) apply either at the data level
(e.g., videos) or at the implementation level (source code)
of the product line. Two main approaches are then possible
to prevent the discovery of trade secrets.
First, source code deconstruction, such as control flow de-
generation and data flow disturbance, are essential obfusca-
tion techniques [4]. An open challenge is to develop tech-
niques for obfuscating specifically the variability and mod-
ularity in the source code or data. A second approach is
to obfuscate the mapping between features/options and the
corresponding artefacts. For instance, a one-to-one mapping
may be too easy to identify and understand. The challenge
is to develop innovative techniques, ideally non intrusive for
product line developers and agnostic to a domain, for di-
versifying the mapping. The two approaches can be used
independently or in combination, depending on the product
line characteristics.
Protection of negative variability (RD2). Some
product lines exhibit all their functionality and content once
and for all. They use negative variability (as opposed to the
previous positive variability) in which all different variants
are expressed; the variants are activated depending on some
conditions [7]. It is the case of online newspapers (see Sec-
tion 2.1). It may also be the case in Web configurators (see
Section 2.3) in which options are hidden or depicted on-the-
fly depending on some user choices. The source code of such
configurators already contains the content for activating/de-
activating options typically through JavaScript. Negative
variability cannot be accused of being the root cause of vul-
nerabilities. However, it is necessary to either: (1) improve
the mechanism used to remove or activate some variants.
For instance, access controls (e.g., at the server side) or ob-
fuscations can be considered; (2) obfuscate the pre-defined
variants. For example, in the case of online newspapers, the
content of members’ articles can be encrypted.
An interesting research direction is to determine whether
(and if yes, when) negative variability presents more secu-
rity guarantees than positive variability (or the other way
around). Product lines can indeed use the two kinds of vari-
ability (e.g., as in Web configurators).
Barriers to master the configuration space (RD3).
Understanding a configuration set may have an interest per
se since trade secrets are hidden there. For example, the
video generator of Section 2.2 has a strategy for generating
some frequencies of features. The idea is that some features
corresponding to some video sequences are rarely activated
(e.g., in 0.1% of configuration) for surprising the visitor. As
another example, Web configurators exhibit options with
marketing or technical constraints. In the two examples,
the ability of an attacker to crawl the configuration space is
the key for discovering trade secrets. A comprehensive visit
is the worst situation since the extracted knowledge is then
complete. Another threat of a (comprehensive) mastering
of the configuration space is that attacker can experiment
the effects the configurations have on the product line. It
is one of the basis to understand or guess the underlying
implementation of a product line. In the video generator,
setting a configuration leads to a new video variant that
can be then analyzed. A comprehensive visit is again the
worst situation since all corresponding variants and related
artefacts are then accessible.
The challenge of RD3 is to develop barriers to limit the
exploration of the configuration space. For instance, mech-
anisms for blocking IP addresses can be considered in case
many requests for crawling the configuration space are ob-
served (see Section 2.2). Many specific factors can influence
the definition of a politics of configuration access.
RD4: Cost-benefit tradeoffs. On the one hand, pro-
tecting variability and configurations has admittedly a cost.
The technical or management effort can be more or less im-
portant – from a drastic change in the design of the product
line to small increments to re-enforce access controls. On the
other hand, the trade secrets an organization has to protect
and the possible consequences highly vary. A trade secret
can give access to very few non-members, but can also lead
to lose any competing advantage.
Hence a tradeoff has to be found. The importance of trade
secrets a product line can jeopardize should justify the in-
vestments required to develop and deploy protecting mecha-
nisms. A spectrum of more or less sophisticated techniques
can thus emerge. An ideal solution (hence a challenge) is to
let product line developers follow their usual methods while
guaranteeing adequate security.
Concluding remarks. In this paper, we provided evi-
dence that product lines can jeopardize their trade secrets.
Our vision is that it is urgent to cross-fertilize the research
results in software product lines and security. Any software
systems may come up against security/protection issues, yet
the specificities of handling variability/configurations raise
novel and difficult challenges. We mainly took the perspec-
tive of a defender; the research can be considered from an
attacker point of view as well (though ethics and legal as-
pects have to be defined). For concluding, we formulate the
idea that software variability of product lines, as a key com-
peting advantage and first-class citizen, should itself vary to
complicate the task of an external attacker.
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